November, z934

ANNOUNCEMENT

The UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW takes pleasure in announcing the election and induction into office of Louis J. GOFFMAN as Secretary
and member of the Managing Board for the year 1934-1935.
NOTES
TE LAW ScHooL-The registration for the year 1934-35 " is 423, 6 more
than last year. This is the third year in which there has been a slight increase,
although it is probably more accurate to say, in view of the slight variations
in the last three years, that we have a new normal level of enrollment which is
substantially below that of 1929.
Since the entire University is on a program restricted by the necessities
of economy, little in the way of expansion of courses is to be noted. The course
in Persons reappears and is being taught by Mr. Joseph J. Lawler, who is on
his second year's work as Gowen Fellow. The new program in the field of
Business Associations is shaping up very satisfactorily. An additional class hour
has been given to Mr. Frey for one term of the Second Year work, and he and
Mr. Finletter have divided the material for the advanced courses in the Business
Associations field. Professor Dickinson continues in his position as Assistant
Secretary of the Department of Commerce, and, as last year, continues to offer
his courses in Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Public Service Corporations.
Continued evidence of valuable help to the school from its graduates is
stiown by the formation of a new committee to assist young lawyers in obtaining
positions. Last year a committee was formed to assist in placements in New
York, Chicago, Washington, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg and Wilmington. This
year President McCracken appointed a committee containing representatives of
each class from i9oo to the present to cover the field in and about Philadelphia.
Mr. Frederick H. Knight is Chairman of this committee and Mr. Thomas B. K.
Ringe, Secretary. The committee is in touch with Philadelphia and neighboring
offices which, from time to time, may be in need of young lawyers. It is also hoped
that the committee may assist lawyers already established who wish to make
changes in their connections or find office associates. In a solution of such questions the cordial response already received to the committee's initial efforts gives
promise of great usefulness.
Herbert F. Goodrich.
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o5
9

98
9

12

415

417

423

Total

19

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

LEGAL SAFEGUARDS ABOUT TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN A DIRECTOR AND His

CORPORATIoN-The growth of corporations has been both an offspring and a

parent of the huge dealings in business and financial matters. The unfortunate
position to which shareholders have been too often relegated seems a necessary
attendant to the rise of the corporation to its place of gigantic power and
influence. By necessity the corporate set-up has placed at its head a group of
directors and officers into whose hands have been intrusted sole management of
business policies together with the money necessary for their execution. This may
be termed the cause. The effect has been equally apparent. Not only has there
been a gravitation of these powers into the hands of a diminishing few, but

all too frequently management has violated its duties toward ownership. 1 For
the prevention of these abuses the courts have built up certain so-called principles to govern the conduct of directors and officers in their relations with the
corporation and shareholder.
The importance of having directors who will subordinate personal interests
to the corporation's benefit cannot be overestimated. Directors, in the final
analysis, have supreme power over corporate affairs. Shareholders are today
placed in the anomalous position of owning the business, but, because of stock
diffusion and the growth in the size of business units, having such ownership
resolve itself into utter dependence on the honesty of the management.2 The
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I. "The growth of corporate enterprise has been drying up individual independence
and initiative, drying up the life of the big town and the small town, and the hamlet. We
are becoming a. nation of hired men, hired by great aggregations of capital, theoretically
controlled by absentee stockholders, who are however so numerous and whose individual
interest is generally so small that their control is inarticulate and difficult to express. This
corporate growth in large measure was inevitable and no doubt desirable. To attempt to
reverse it would be like turning back the hands of the clock." Statement by R. C. Leffingwell, partner of J. P. Morgan & Co., before Banking Comm. of the United States Senate.
The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Sept. 22d, 1934, at 2.
45 HARv. L. Rxv. 1365.
2. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees (932)
See Report of the Stockholders Investigating Committee of the Texas Corporation reviewed by Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct (934) 47 HARv. L. Rav. 1305, 1308.
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proxy machinery has been a material factor in relieving stockholders of the last
vestige of control and placing it in the management's hands. The difficulty of
removing directors reduces the degree of control of the true owners of the
corporation still further. It lies in the judgment of the directors whether or
not stock shall be issued for property, thus reducing the proportion of control
a shareholder might still retain, and making pre-emptive rights of doubtful value.
In addition, statutes permit the corporation to cut off pre-emptive rights by appropriate charter provisions.3 The valuation of property to be received for stock
depends upon the judgment of directors. The time for the payment of dividends
is within the discretion of the directors. Finally, control over the issuance of
the corporation's financial statements further enhances the dominance of management.4
It is a common statutory provision that the directors must be shareholders
in the corporation. The purpose is obvious-to give directors some measure of
personal interest in corporate affairs. But the result in too many instances shows
an overabundance of enthusiasm for the protection of that interest. The methods
by which this may be done are manifold. Profits may be shifted from a parent
corporation to a subsidiary in which the controlling group has a large interest. 5
In distributing such profits as are made, profits may be diverted from one class
of stock to another.6 The management's self interest may go to the extreme
of wrecking a corporation for their own advantage at the expense of the security
holders.' In market operations "inside information" may be used to buy low
from present shareholders and sell high to future shareholders. The directors
may make contracts with the corporation, obtaining preferences which no
stranger could. Profit sharing plans may result in wasting the assets of the corporation which rightfully belong to the shareholder.' The limitations upon these
methods are only those placed upon human guile and inventiveness. The last
refuge of the shareholder lies in the legal safeguards placed upon the director's
actions by the courts. Thus an examination of the most important safeguards
is revealing-though confusing if an attempt is made to apply logically the customary legal language.
A favorite postulate of the courts in this respect is that a director stands in
a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and cannot represent both himself
and it.9 Accordingly, such transactions are said to be voidable at the option of
the corporation merely because of the relationship of the parties and -without
regard to whether the corporation has been injured, the contract is fair or
unfair, or the officer has acted in good or bad faith."0 Yet an examination of the
cases is illuminating. In nearly all of the cases used to substantiate the rule
there has been evidence of unfairness to the corporation or an undeserved benefit
to the director: either the director has acted in bad faith, the contract was unfair,
3. PA. STAT.
4. BERLE AND
5. Wardell v.
Mich. 44I, IO5 N.
Fox (1933) 315.
6. BERLE AND

ANN. (Purdon, 1933)

tit. 15, § 2852-611.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY

(0933) 202.

Union P. R. R., io3 U. S. 651 (88o)

; Sparrow v. Bement & Sons, i42
W. 881 (1905); UPTON SINCLAIR, UPTON SINCLAIR PESENrS WILIAm

MEANS, op. Cit. stpra note 4, at 123.
7. Id. at i2.
& Note (93)
4r YALE L. J. io9; Note (0933) 42 YAL.E L. J. 419; Note
HAzv. L. REv. 828; (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 433.

(0933) 46

9. Stanton v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 8i Mont. 44, 261 Pac. 620 (1927); Rugger v.
Mt. Hood Elec. Co., i43 Ore. 193, 20 P. (2d) 432 (I933); Federal Mtge. Co. v. Simes,
210 Wis. 139, 245 N. W. i6g (1932); 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE
CORPORATONS (93)
§9-4; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1933) tit. i5, §2852-408.
10. Mobile Land Imp. Co. v. Gass, 142 Ala. 52o, 39 So. M (igo4) ; Massoth v. Central Bus Corp., io4 Conn. 683, 134 Ati. 236 (1926) (salaries were found to be reasonable);
.3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 924.
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or the corporation was injured." Hence, the rule merely resolves itself into
saying that where the director undeservedly profits, the corporation unnecessarily suffers, or no such contract would have been entered into with a stranger,
such transaction will be set aside. While some courts still adhere to the strict
letter of the rule regardless of the fairness of the transaction to all parties concerned, 1 2 such a prophylactic doctrine is neither the tendency nor desirable. 3 It
is obvious that not all transactions in which a director is one of the parties'and
the corporation the other is or should be set aside without a careful scrutiny of
the facts of the case. The sole reason advanced for such an arbitrary holding
in those cases where the facts disclose no fraud or conduct tantamount to it or
injury to the corporation, is to prevent conflicting interests from tempting
human failings.' 4 In other words, such considerations as absolute fairness to
the corporation, or actual benefit to it in the sense that the director may be the
only one available to enter into a necessary contract, and the demand for secrecy
regarding the corporate needs, are all subordinated to the fear of temptation.
And it is interesting to note that in most cases the courts are prompted to express
their fear of tempting the directors not because advantage might be taken, but
because that has already occurred.' 5
If the strict rule is adopted, then the courts are given an opportunity to
voice another much-quoted bit of legalistic thought. It is this: "where the corI. Wardell v. U. P. R. R., 1o3 U. S. 651 (188o) (directors formed a new corporation in an effort to get favorable contracts); Hook v. Ayers, 8o Fed. 978 (C. C. A. 7th,
1897) (no disclosure by president) ; Burnes v. Burnes, 132 Fed. 485 (W. D. Mo. 1904) (no

disclosure that directors were to profit) ; Fulkerson v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co.,

291

Fed.

784 (D. Mont. 1923) (agent of the insurance company mailed a binder of his own policy
after the damage was done); Memphis & C. R. R. v. Woods, 88 Ala. 630, 7 So. Io8 (1889)

(fraud on directors' part at shareholder's expense) ; Consumers' Ice & Coal Co. v. Security
Bank and Trust Co., 17o Ark. 530,

280

S.W. 677 (1926)

(mismanagement by directors

for own benefit); Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 135 Pac. 496

(1913) (secret arrangement with employee to share profits) ; Gilman, C. & S. R. R. v.
Kelly, 77 Ill. 426 (1875) (directors entered into stock transactions with company with
which corporation did business, by which directors were to profit) ; Ryan v. Leavenworth,
A. & N. W. Ry., 21 Kans. 365 (0879) (concealment of essential facts); Hill v. Marston,
178 Mass. 285, 59 N. E. 766 (19O1) (president gave preference to himself when company
went insolvent); Old Mtge. & Fin. Co. v. Pasadena Land Co., 24I Mich. 426, 216 N. W.
922

(1928) (terms of transaction were unfair to shareholders) ; Leonhardt v. Citizens Bank

of Ulysses, 56 Neb. 38, 76 N. W. 452 (1898) (partners indebted on a note became officers
of corporation holding the note and renewed it so as to discharge themselves) ; Pearson v.
Concord R. Corp., 62 N. H. 537 (1883) (managers of road bought control of rival to get
favorable contracts).
12. Bill v. Western U. Tel. Co., i6 Fed. 14 (S. D. N. Y. 1883); Sims v. Petaluma
Gas Light Co., 131 Cal. 6s6, 63 Pac. ioii (ioi); Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. R. R., io3

N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355 (1886).

California has been particularly severe on directors' transactions with the corporation,
due largely to the application of trust rules from its Civil Code. Note (.I93i) ig CALIF.
L. RE-v. 3o4. But this has been greatly modified by statute. CAL. CIVIL CODE (Deering,
193) c. 862, § 311. See Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation
Law (I93i) i9 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 475, et seq.
Likewise it is doubtful whether Munson v. Syracuse G. & C. R. R., supra, is still the
prevailing New York view. See Note (i929) 29 CoL L. REV. 338, 342.
13. BALLANTINE, PRIVATE COaPORATIONS (1927) §

123,

where it is said, "This is the

application of the 'prophylactic principle' in its most extreme form, and may seriously hamper honest corporate business."
14. It is usually expressed that, "Humanity is so constituted that when these conflicting interests arise the temptation is usually too great to be overcome, and duty is sacrificed to interest." Pacific Vinegar & Pickle Works v. Smith, 145 Cal. 352, 365, 78 Pac.
550, 554 (i904). See Wardell v. Union P. R. R., io3 U. S. 65i, 658 (188o).
I5.In Pacific Vinegar & Pickle Works v. Smith, 145 Cal. 352, 78 Pa( 550 (19O4),
the interested directors concealed facts essential to the board's knowledge. In Wardell v.
Union P. R. R., 103 U. S. 651 (i88o), the directors tried to divert new business to a corporation of their own.
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poration in a transaction with a director acts through other officers, the corporation may have the contract set aside only on proof of unfairness causing actual
injury to the corporation or of bad faith of the officers." 18 Thus, where the director represents both himself and the corporation the transaction is voidable merely
because of the relationship, 17 but where disinterested officers, i. e., others, represent the corporation, such transaction may be set aside only on proof of unfairness. This principle merely states the converse of the first, and is likewise of
doubtful value in deciding different factual situations. The sole effect is to
put emphasis on the question of who represents the corporation. Irrespective of
this question the courts have, while ascertaining the interests of the directors
who have acted in order to see if their relationship to the transaction may be
called interested, examined the fairness of the entire transaction. This seems to be
the ultimate problem. If any unfairness to the corporation is present, or the
directors will gain a benefit which a third person could not, the transaction will
be upset no matter who represents the corporation. s
An interested director represents the corporation when he takes part in
making or authorizing the contract or other transaction, or his vote is necessary
to bind the corporation. 9 Hence, while it has been held that where the director
does not vote on the transaction or is absent from the meeting, the transaction
is binding unless unfairness or actual injury to the corporation be proved, 2 the
proper emphasis belongs upon the part played by the director who is the motivating force behind the transaction, rather than upon his mere presence at the
meeting. It is in this particular situation that rigid scrutiny by the court is
important. 21 And whenever the motivating director stands to profit unduly as
a result22 of the deal, the courts will unhesitatingly refuse to enforce the transaction.
16. 3 FLETCHEa, op. cit. supra note 9, § 93I; see Note (Ig3i) I9 CALIF. L. REV.304, 305.
Supra note 9.
I8. Schemmel v. Hill, 91 Ind. App. 373, 69 N. E. 678 (I93o) (the corporation purchased property at an unfair price) ; Baker v. Helner Realty Co., 265 Mich. 625, 251 N. W.
793 (933) (land transferred to president before the directors met to authorize the transfer) ; Williams & Miller Gin Co. v. Knutson, 63 S. W. (2d) 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
(president agreed to cancel director's note which corporation held); Hein v. Forney, 164
17.

Wash. 309, 2 P. (2d) 741 (1931)

(trustee of corporation made payment on notes he held

against it to renew running of Statute of Limitations).
19. Beers v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 Hun 75, 2o N. Y. Supp. 788 (1892). In Anderson v. Gailey, 33 F. (2d) 589 (N. D. Ga. I929), the director's vote was the deciding
one on the question of whether or not the corporation should sue him. In Hinkley v. Sagemiller, 191 Wis. 512, 2IO N. W. 839 (1927), the director's vote was the deciding one on
the question of whether or not he should be suspended from office for misconduct. It is
submitted that such "interest" should be distinguished from being merely a party to a contract.

3 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 9, § 936.

2o. Hax v. R. T. Davis Mill Co., 39 Mo. App. 453 (1889);

but cf. Beers v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 66 Hun 75, 2o N. Y. Supp. 788 (1892).
21. See text infra page 61.
22. See Anderson v. Gailey; Hinkley v. Sagemiller, both sitpra note 19. Cutting v.
Woodward, 255 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) (fraud involved); Sellers v. Phoenix Iron
Co., 13 Fed. 2o (E. D. Pa. i8i) (officers took profits, controlled corporation); Garden
Development Co: v. Warren Ranch, 35 Ariz. 254, 226 Pac. 839 (1929) (lease unfair to
corporation); Miner v. The Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N. W. 218 (1892) (fraud
in officers' salaries and in leases made with them) ; Stanton v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.,
81 Mont. 44, 26I Pac. 620 (1927) (undue profit would have accrued to the director who
voted) ; Texas Auto Co. v. Arbetter, I S. W. (2d) 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (vicepresident conveyed lot to secretary when the president was absent for only "$5.oo and other
consideration").
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If the statement that the director stands in a fiduciary relationship to the

corporation means anything,2 3 it is obvious that the relationship exists whether

the director votes or not. The director occupies his position solely for the purpose of expressing his opinion on corporate business, and to refrain purposely
from voting when he is probably in the best position of any of the board to
pass on a question, seems a direct violation of his duty to the corporation or the
shareholders.2" Yet this is what a strict interpretation of these principles, in
effect, advocates. There is no sound reason why a contract should not be upheld
when the director makes full disclosure of his interest to the other members of
the board and takes no advantage of his position.2 5 Thus, where the interested
director does vote in favor of a contract, whether or not there is a majority without his vote should not be the deciding test on the question of voiding the contract, merely because of the relationship, and without a further examination of
the fairness.2"

To do so stamps as fraudulent every contract in which the direc-

tor has an interest 27 while every other contract or transaction entered into by
other members of the board is prina facie entirely fair. The situation becomes
paradoxical when it is recalled that these men have been voted into office because
of their ability and honesty, given huge sums of mohey and responsibilities, and
yet, for example, are not allowed to sell a bit of land to their28 corporation because
they are interested in the transaction and represent it too.
One possible objection to permitting the court to evaluate the fairness of a
particular transaction may arise in this way. Of necessity, the effect of the
court's scrutiny may be to substitute its own judgment for that of the directors
in entering into a particular transaction. Hence, where the directors believe that
a particular contract with one of themselves, for instance in the purchase of
property, may be advantageous in the near future, and their judgment is wrong,
a trouble-seeking shareholder may have the entire transaction avoided. But
23. Supra note io. The directors' ". . . superior position imposed upon them some
duty to the plaintiff as well as to the corporation at least not to take advantage of the
opportunity afforded by their position to wrong her . . .and to refrain from intentionally
abusing that power ... " Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, .iIo N. Y. Supp.
629 (1908).
24. Where it doesn't appear that the directors interested in the transaction voted, and
the fact of their voting would render the transaction voidable merely because of the relationship, ". . . it should be presumed that he or they did not vote, and that his or their
vote was not necessary to the passage of the resolution, so that the transaction cannot be
3 FLETCHER,
avoided except for cause other than the mere relationship of the parties."
op. cit. supra note 9, § 934. In Barrett v. Smith, i85 Minn. 596, 242 N. W. 392 (1932)
the directors whose salaries were raised purposely absented themselves from the meeting which was to ratify the increase, but the court properly threw the transaction out because of the control exercised over the rest of the board.
25. Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 67 S. W. 92 (I9O2).
26. This is the rule used in Cardin Bldg. Co. v. Smith, 125 Okla. 300, 258 Pac. 91o
(927),
but the result was reached because of the fairness of the conveyance by the corporation to the director. The better view was taken in Clark v. American Coal Co., 86
Iowa 436, 53 N. W. 291 (1892) ; Budd v. Walla Walla Print. Co., 2 Wash. Terr. 347, 7
Pac. 896 (I885). In both cases the court considered the fairness of the transaction rather
the necessity of the interested directors' vote to constitute a majority, and held both transactions fair.
27. "What boots it to say in one breath that as a matter of law the director may
deal with the corporation as a stranger, and in the next to say that merely because he
is a director he must as a matter of law be deemed prima facie to have cheated or acted
in bad faith to his corporation?" Gager, J., dissenting in Jordon v. Jordon, 94 Conn. 384,
398, io9 Atl. 84, 520 (,920).
28. A minority of courts hold a sale of corporate property to a director voidable
even though it is fair and the corporation is represented by disinterested directors. Morgan v. King, 27 Colo. 539, 63 Pac. 416 (igOO).
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the value of the rule of fairness cannot be doubted29 in the long run and it has
been made statutory law in at least one jurisdiction.
The cases cited in support of the proposition that a transaction is voidable
merely because of the relationship where the director's vote is needed to make
up a quorum or a majority to pass the resolution authorizing the transaction,"
are likewise fraught with examples of unfairness to the corporation or of undeserved benefit to the director.31 Thus once more the emphasis properly belongs
not on the fact that the director's vote was needed to pass the resolution but
on the unfairness on the part of the director in seeking to benefit himself unduly,
or on a possible injury to the corporation. More important than the factor of
the director's presence or vote is the degree of control he may exercise over the
remaining members of the board even when absent. 32
The futility of attempting to classify the cases, either on the basis that the
director dealt with himself or with other directors who represented the corporation, is best illustrated by a different situation where the director represents
the corporation in a transaction with third persons, but nevertheless the interest
of the participating director is quite obvious. Thus, in South Georgia Holding
Co. v. Hiatt,33 the court sustained a transaction in which the director voted to
issue stock in cancellation of the corporation's obligation in defendant's hands4
plus wiping out of the director's obligation. In Kleinsasser v. McNanara3
the directors who had acquired leases and options adjoining the corporation's
property, voted to sell the corporate holdings to a buyer who would not accept
their own land without a sale of the corporate property. And in Mitchell v'.
The Highland-Western Glass Co." the directors voted to sell the business to
another corporation in which they were to receive the same salaries as had been
paid them in the selling corporation. In these cases the courts upheld the transactions and said the directors were not dealing with themselves but were transacting business with third persons; but the underlying rationale was in the court's
finding that the price was fair and the transactions beneficial to the corporation.
Once more the motivating factor seems to be the fairness of the transaction
which caused the court to overlook the fact that the directors did benefit solely
through their connections.
Recent cases permitting dealings between director and corporation reveal
a tendency on the part of courts not to confine the management as closely as
prior decisions did. 8 Today, by the liberal and preferred rule the corporation
and the director can transact business on nearly the same basis as if the director
29. CAL Civn._ CODE (Deering. 1931) c. 862, § 311; see Ballantine, loc. cit. supra note 12.
Charter provisions permit transactions between director and corporation, but the validity
of these is doubtful. BEn.z AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 229.
3o. See cases collected in 3 FrrcnER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 936, and cases cited
in note 26, supra.
3. Alward v. Broadway Gold Mining Co., 94 Mont. 45, 2o P. (2d) 647 (933)
(president renewed his mother's note); Rugger v. Mt. Hood Electric Co., 143 Ore. 193,
20 P. (2d) 412. (1933) (the director whose contract was accepted by the corporation was
to give stock bonus to two of the four directors who voted to accept it) ; see supra note
and the specific illustrations cited there.
32. Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, i2 Ariz. 245, ioo Pac. 784 (i9og) ; Globe Woolen Co. v.
Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N. Y. 483, 121 N. E. 378 (i918); Barrett v. Smith, I85 Minn.

596, z42 N. W. 392 (1932).
33. 2 F. Supp. 91 (M. D. Ga. 1933).
34. 129 Cal. App. 49, i8 P. (2d) 423 (1933).
35. i9 Del. Ch. 326, 167 Atl. 83r (933).
36. See Note (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 338; Note (i93i)

Interested Directors it; CorporateTransactions (193i) 6
liberalize the principles hitherto governing is approved.

IND.

ig CAL P. L. REv. 3o4; James,
L. J. 413, in which the trend to
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were a stranger.37 The sole difference lies properly in the rigid scrutiny such
transactions must undergo by the courts; only the guilty need fear this. The
same tendency towards liberalization is visible in cases involving the cognate
8
problem of transactions between corporations having interlocking directorates.
take
It is well settled that a director can lend money to his corporation and
9
The
as security an obligation which can be enforced against the corporation.
in a
weakness of any argument against allowing such loans is best exposed
0
quotation from the leading case of Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury."
"Such a doctrine, while it would afford little protection to the corporation against actual fraud or oppression, would deprive it of the aid of those
most interested in giving aid judiciously and best qualified to judge of the
necessity of that aid, and to the extent to which it may safely be given."
The same result has been reached even where a majority of the directors were
interested in the transaction. 41
Since the better view, as previously stated, is to permit more freedom in
transactions between corporation and director, it might appear that the interests
of shareholders and creditors would be jeopardized. However, the all-important
qualification that such transactions must be free from fraud or other unfairness
makes the position of the shareholder relatively safe. This is achieved by the
court's careful scrutiny of the transactions "if not with suspicion, at least with
the most scrupulous care," 42 and its readiness to set it aside "upon much slighter
grounds" than if the corporation dealt with a stranger.4 3 These principles are
not mere words, for Equity will resolve no doubts in favor of the director.
Rather, the ancient suspicion cast on director's dealings will cause the adoption of
that construction of a contract most favorable to the corporation.4 4 So, in the
recent case of Alexander v. Theleinan,45 where both the corporation and a director gave options on shares in the corporation, and the court could have found
either way on the question which of these was exercised by the optionee, the
corporation was given the benefit of the doubt.
The same care is exercised in watching other transactions. In the muchdiscussed case of Rogers v. Hill,46 it was held that even where there was no inference of actual or constructive fraud in making bonus payments under a by-law,
the profits may make these amounts so large as to warrant investigation in a
court of equity in the interests of the company. This far-reaching decision is
indicative of the broad scope of equitable powers which safeguard the share37. Among other things, directors and officers can lend money to the corporation and
take security, infra note 39, vote salaries to themselves, infra note 52, sell property to the
corporation, Milwaukee Cold-Storage Co. v. Dexter, 99 Wis. 214, 74 N. W. 976 (1898);
vote on a contract to buy from another corporation in which a director is also a member
of the board, Hines v. Lausterer, 137 Misc. 397, 238 N. Y. Supp. 276 (ig3i) ; lease property to the corporation, Harris v. United Service Co., 132 Ark. 779, 32 S. W. (2d) 618
(930).
38. Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 673, 53 Atl. 842 (i9o3); South
Side Trust Co. v. Washington Tin Plate Co., 252 Pa. 237, 97 Atl. 450 (1916) ; see Note
(932) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 598.
39. Wainwright v. Roots Co., 176 Ind. 682, 97 N. E. 8 (1912); Schnittger v. Old
Home Consol. Min. Co., 144 Cal. 6o3, 78 Pac. 9 (19o4).
40. 91 U. S. 587, at 589 (875).
41. Minn. Loan and Trust Co. v. Peterlar Car Co., 132 Minn. 277, 156 N. W. 255
(1916) ; Levitt N. Oxford & Geneva Silver Min. Co., 3 Utah 265, i Pac. 356 (1882).
42. Hubbard v. N. Y., N. E. & W. Inv. Co., 14 Fed. 675, 676 (D. Mass. 1882).
43. Hallam v. The Indianola Hotel Co., 56 Iowa 178, i8o, 9 N. W. iii, 1i2 (iS8i).
44. McLendon Hardware Co. v. Black, 264 S. W. 1oIi (Tex. Civ. App. I9z4).

45. 69 F. (2d) 6io (C. C. A. ioth, 1934).
46. 289 U. S. 582 (I933) ; see Note (i933) 46 HA~v. L. REv. 828; (933)

REv. 433.
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holder: a by-law passed in 1912 under which the payments were sought to be
justified, was of no avail where the sums paid became so large "as in substance
and effect to amount to spoliation or waste of corporate property." 47 Hence it
is clear that such plans are reviewable as to reasonableness, 48 and will be approved
only where the sums paid are found fair.49 In the same vein it has been held
that the payment of large bonuses to the officers of a corporation paying only
moderate dividends, is prima facie evidence of a misappropriation of funds.50
Equity further demands in this situation that the bonus payments bear a relation
to the value of the services for which they are given, or else "it is a gift in part,
and the majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate property
against the protests of the minority." "
Likewise, Equity carefully scrutinizes the voting of salaries to directors and
officers by themselves. The burden of proving the reasonableness of such salaries
is placed upon the directors.52 Whether the officers themselves are the majority
shareholders or not, compensation will be reduced to a sum which the court
deems reasonable.3 Also, before any increase in salary will be permitted, the
amount of business done must warrant it, 54 and the work done by the directors
and officers must likewise be deserving. 5 Nor are large profits alone a ground
for high salaries."8 In considering what is reasonable Equity looks to the
amount of salaries paid elsewhere in similar businesses in order to gain a fair
picture of the circumstances involved.17 The courts apply the same rule to
salaries as they do to bonus payments. In either case the absence of fraud
is immaterial. "The right of recovery for the benefit of the corporation rests
upon the excessive payment to a director. This conclusion is supported by the
great weight of authority." 58
The corporation can recover from the director a commission received from
a broker for the sale of the corporation's bonds. 9 An agreement between an
officer and an employee will not be enforced where the latter in consideration
of being given a job is to pay the officer a share of his salary. 0 On the other
hand, Equity will not interfere where it deems additional services, authorized by
the by-laws or board, to be worth extra compensation. 61 And where a nominal
director acted as broker for his corporation in the purchase of property, he was
permitted to receive fees from both seller and buyer where no fraud or unfairness was shown!"
Another type of transaction deserving of comment is that where the director
deals with a shareholder in buying shares or sells shares of his own to a pro47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 591.
Booth v. Beattie, 95 N. J. Eq. 776, 777, 118 Atl. 257 (922).
Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N. W. 586 (1922).
Shera v. Carbon Steel Co., 245 Fed. 589 (S. D. W. Va. 1917).
Rogers v. Hill, 289 U. S. 582, at 591.
52. MeKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 2o5 N. W. 583 (925).
Contra: Seitz v. Union
Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N. W. 586 (1922).
53. Note (1933) 42 YAI.z L. J. 419, 423. But where the directors are the sole shareholders they can vote themselves salaries without ratification. Bates Street Shirt Co.
v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 156 At. 293 (193i).
54. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Wood, 97 Fla. 493, 121 So. 789 (1929).
55. Stratis v. Andreson, 254 Mass. 536, 15o N. E. 832 (1926).
56. McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 205 N. W. 583 (1925).
57. Backus v. Finklestein, 23 F. (2d) 531 (D. Minn. 1924).
58. Stratis v. Andreson, 254 Mass. 536, 54o, 15o N. E. 832, 833 (1925).
59. Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 Atl. 54 (1928).
60. Langley v. Spooky Hollow Realty Co., 251 Ky. 76, 64 S. W. (2d) 459 (1933);

cf.

Dubbs v. Kramer,

302

Pa. 455, 153 Atl. 733 (1931).

6I. Vaught v. Charleston Nat. Bank, 62 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. iOth, 1933); Pence
v. West Side Hospital of Chicago, 265 Ill. App. 56o (1932).
62. Princeton Power Co. v. Hardy,

1O3

W. Va. 329, 137 S. E. 36z (1927).
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spective shareholder. Courts invariably hold that the director is or is not in a
fiduciary relationship with the shareholder, and hence, is or is not under an obligation to reveal what he knows, depending on the result that has already been
determined in the court's mind. Such language expresses a result rather than the
reason. The majority of the courts refuse to impose any obligationon adirector to
disclose to a shareholder informationwhich he has affecting the valueof the shares
in the near future, saying that no fiduciary relationship exists toward the shareholder.6 3 This is in direct contrast to the attitude frequently taken by courts in
discussing contracts or other transactions made by directors with the corporation. There is an inconsistency, for the director should not be bound by the
ties of his position to the corporation only and be able to ignore the people who
are behind the entity. A minority which has at least intellectual support is
just as vehement in imposing such a duty.64 It is true that the minority rule has
grown up in cases where the facts involved would have merited no other result
because of the presence of actual fraud, misrepresentation, etc.6 These decisions refuse to allow a director who has been placed in a position of trust by
the shareholders for the purpose of protecting their interests to utilize information gained from his position to their disadvantage. The anomaly of the situation is especially striking since that information is not available to them because
the director who has first access to it controls its release. It is primarily for this
reason that the rule of "special circumstances" has been adopted in the federal
courts,6 6 which, while unwilling to impose flatly a duty of disclosure, recognize
that the circumstances of the case may make the failure to reveal known information grounds for an action by the shareholder. On the other hand, a too
strict observance of the minority rule may place the director between the Scylla
of his duty to the corporation not to disclose too much and the Charybdis of
his obligation to the shareholder, not to disclose too little. In Hotchkiss v.
6
Fisher,
the director in reply to the question, truthfully said that he did not
know whether a dividend would be declared and gave the shareholder the corporation's latest financial statement. But it was held there should have been
"summation by defendant of the information disclosed by the statement, and
the furnishing of any other information he possessed bearing specifically on the
subject of likelihood of declaration of a dividend." "
The fear of thus burdening the director has been instrumental in cases
reaching an opposite result.69 Likewise, where the shares are bought on the
stock exchange, the impracticability of disclosure has led courts to refrain from
imposing such duty.70 To hold that the director must reveal everything he
knows or should know regarding the true value of the stock is an arbitrary
requirement, hinging too largely on the edge of the director's own opinion,
and thus making the rule too vague for effectiveness. Further, it must be
63. Walker, The Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock From His Stockholders (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 637; Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases

of Stock

(1927)

25

MICH.

L. Rav. 827; see notes following.

64. Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder
(igio) 8 MiCH. L. REv. 267; and see notes infra.
65. Oliver v. Oliver, ii8 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (19o3); Saville v. Sweet, 234 App.
Div. 236, 254 N. Y. Supp. 768 (1932) ; see the excellent case study by Wilgus, supra note
64. See (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 582, where it is questioned whether the fiduciary relationship
would have been discovered in the absence of the director's duplicity.
66. Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909) (the special circumstances were that the defendant was a director, owned three-quarters of the shares, was administrator-general, did
the negotiating with the government for the sale of land).
67. 136 Kans. 530, I6 P. (2d) 531 (1932), (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 847.
68. Id. at 536, 16 P. (2d) at 534.
69. Walker and Berle, both siepra note 63.
70. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, i86 N. E. 659 (1933), (933)
47 HAv. L.
REV. 353; Walker, supra note 63 at 640.
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realized that certain pending transactions which may affect the value of the
stock cannot be disclosed prematurely for fear of revealing information to
competitors. 71 Under the minority view the whole facts of the particular case
must be scrutinized by the court to see whether the director did withhold information which properly could have been disclosed at that time. Such an attitude
compares favorably with the liberal one advocated regarding contracts made by
the director with the corporation.
Some of the courts adhering to the majority rule state that the director
must not withhold something of "substantial consequence". 72 Others say that
the director is not bound to volunteer information unless he is asked, and can
treat the shareholder as a stranger.73 But by requiring disclosure if asked, the
prevailing thought is that the information obtained by the director through his
position belongs to the shareholder. Adherence to the majority rule in recent
years has generally been confined to cases where the shareholder with whom
the director dealt was also a director and thus should have known for himself
the true state of affairs,7 4 or had worked for the corporation and was familiar
with the stock's possibilities,7 5 or the director had acted fairly in selling the shares
for the shareholder at the latter's price and had made no commission himself.78
In other words, the facts of these cases justify the result regardless of whether
or not there is a fiduciary relationship existing between director and shareholder.
But those courts holding there is a fiduciary relationship to the corporation
alone, and not to the shareholder, with the result that directors can be sued only
if the corporation is injured, ignore the important fact that the directors may
injure the shareholder without injuring the corporation, as where the director
falsifies accounts so that the shareholder pays higher prices than the stock is
worth,7 7 or where the president contracts with a firm selling the
corporate shares
78
to get a percentage of the profit realized from the shares sold.
The latest effort to prevent directors from profiting through their inside
knowledge is the provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This requires all directors to register the amount of shares owned and to report monthly
any changes in such ownership. Any profit realized by the director from transactions with these shares within any period less than six months from the -sale
or purchase of shares is recoverable by the corporation.79 The practical value of
this remains to be seen, but its failings may be mentioned. First, it cannot
include transactions which the director can sponsor in another's name; second,
profits may be taken after holding the shares for six months; and third, it still
ignores the shareholder who has sold his stock and lost the profit. But the
provision does have the effect of preventing wholesale traffic in the corporate
shares by the directors who may embroil themselves so that manipulation may
be resorted to. Moreover,
it is a realization of the problem and an opening
80
wedge for its solution.

71. McMynn v. Peterson, 186 Wis.

442, 2O

N. W. 272 (924) ; see Percival v. Wright,

[I9o2] 2 Ch. 421, 426.

72. Hacker v. Kyle, 211 Wis. 585, 248 N. W. 134 (1933). While thus holding with
the majority, the court realizes that some duty is owed to the shareholder.
73. Waller v. Hodge, 214 Ky. 705, 283 S. W. 1047 (1926).
74. Connolly v. Shannon, io5 N. J. Eq. 155, 147 Atl. 234 (929), (1930) 78 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 559.
75. Waller v. Hodge, 214 Ky. 705, 283 S. W. 1047 (2926) ; Herpolsheimer v. Mich.
Trust Co., 261 Mich. 2o9, 246 N. W. 81 (933).
76. Blabon v. Hay, 269 Mass. 402, 169 N. E. 268 (1929).
77. See Ottinger v. Bennett, 144 App. Div. 525 (1911), rev'd, 203 N. Y. 554 (911).
78. Western State Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 135 Pac. 496 (913).
79. P. L. No. 291, 73d Cong. (934) § 16 (a) (b).
8o. Tracy and MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (934) 32 MICH.
L. REv. O25, io56.
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A corollary to the greater freedom of transaction between director and
corporation is the recognition of the obsolescence of the so-called principles
which have hitherto governed their relations. It is by no means certain that
shareholder's interests are secure from the designs of the unscrupulous director.
But that security is in no way achieved or even assured by ancient restrictions
on directors' dealings with the corporation. To allow circumstances of each
case to govern rather than to abide by a rule disregarding the fairness of the
case will accomplish more in securing benefits to the shareholder.
But that alone is not sufficient. Publicity of all corporate affairs is of
immense importance. 8 This is especially true with regard to corporate loans to
officers,8 2 remuneration, shares traded, and affiliations of all directors with other
corporations. England has associations to investigate abuses of shareholders'
rights, which wield powerful force in uncovering corporate dishonesty.8 3 Much
can yet be done, but nothing is more necessary than to discard outmoded and
superfluous rules which disregard the factual situations involved and actually
prove detrimental to legitimate corporate transactions.
LIABILITY OF A HUSBAND FOR THE TORTS OF His WIFE-With the recent
appointment by the Lord Chancellor of England of a committee to re-examine
the dogma that a husband is liable for the torts of his wife, that doctrine would
seem from present indications to stand in imminent likelihood of serious excission in the place of its birth. Particularly so, if a cue is to be taken from the
fate suffered by the rule in the country of its adoption, where the ambition to
further the legal emancipation of women has obscured the more appropriate social
aim of providing a not too remote source of compensation for plaintiffs injured
by the tortious conduct of married women.
Whatever its origin may have been, it is quite certain that the rule imposing
liability on a husband for the actionable misconduct of his wife was most rigorously applied in England from the earliest times, the only question about which
the courts concerned themselves being whether a marital relation in fact existed
between the joint defendants at the time that liability was sought to be imposed.
Thus, in one of the first cases 1 dealing with this type of vicarious liability it
was held to be immaterial that the husband and wife had separated by private
agreement or that her misconduct had occurred while they were estranged.
The liability, existing solely by reason of the marriage, lasted so long as the
marriage endured, and was extinguished by a divorce a vincuto matrimonii or
by death of the wife.' While the husband's liability extended to antenuptial

8i. "The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of preferential lists and the like, may all be open secrets among the knowing, but the knowing are
few. There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of them into
the open is largely to restrain their happening. Many practices safely pursued in private
lose their justification in public." Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II (Aug.
,933)

8

FORTUNE

53, 55-

82. The Banking Act of 1933 prohibits interlocking interests with companies which
make certain types of loans to persons other than their own subsidiaries, and also loans
by any member bank to its executive officers. See 48 STAT. 194 12 U. S. C. A. VII § 78
(Supp. 1933) ; 48 STAT. 182, 12 U. S. C. A. § 375a (Supp. 1933).
83. Douglas, supra note 2, at 1330.

i. Paget v. Read, I Vern. 143 (Ch. 1682). Accord: Head v. Briscoe, 5 Car. & P. 484,
486 (N. P. 1833) ("And whether their separation be permanent or temporary it does not
affect the question").
2. Capel v. Powell, 17 C. B. N. S. 743, 748 (1864) ; In re Beauchamp, [19o4] I K. B.
572; see Head v. Briscoe, 5 Car. & P. 484 (N. P. 1833). In Burdett v. Home, 28 T. L. R.
83 (C. A. 1911) the court stated that where a judicial separation was obtained for the very
purpose of avoiding liability, the fact that the marriage was dissolved would not be sufficient
to defeat the plaintiff's claim against the husband.
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as well as to post nuptial torts,3 it was recognized that the wife was not relieved
of her liability and she had to be joined as a necessary party defendant, so4 that,
if the husband died, the suit did not abate, but continued against her alone.
Although the rules defining the scope of a husband's responsibility were the
subject of almost undeviating judicial repetition, neither the reason for the doctrine, nor its origin was ever clearly or consistently enunciated in the cases.
Most of the explanations seem merely to have been inserted as a matter of legal
tradition inherited by the incumbent bench from its predecessor, and repeated
without regard to their actual validity. Perhaps the most frequently reiterated
fereason" was that "the husband, in truth, was only joined for the sake of
conformity, and not with the view of asserting any individual right against
him." r Granted that a wife at common law was under a procedural disability
to be the sole party to a suit, and that this gave rise to the practise of joining
her husband, the practical result of what purported only to be procedural circumambience was to impose a tort liability on him. The judgment rendered was
against both husband and wife, but it was his property that was subject to
execution." If the difficulty present in the common law mind 7 was a purely
procedural one, there would seem to be no valid reason for prosecuting the
joinder of husband and wife in such a manner as to create a substantive liability against the husband. On the contrary, in Drury v. Dennis," although the
formality of joining both spouses was complied with, the court refused to enter
a judgment on a verdict which found only the wife guilty of the alleged trespass,
and exonerated the husband. Such a verdict was considered imperfect, and
could only be cured by finding both spouses either guilty or innocent.
Another commonly expressed rationale for the husband's liability was the
obviously superficial one that a wife was incapable of committing a tort; "they
are the torts of her husband, and therefore she creates as against her husband
a liability." ' This, is no more than the restatement of a conclusion: if the tort
is that of the husband, then he should be liable, but the reason for attributing
the independent act of a wife to her husband is still left without answer. Nor
was the effect of such reasoning ever applied by the courts. Were the tort that
of the husband, then his liability should continue even after the death of his
wife; but the contrary position was settled law. 10
Closely resembling the view last expressed, was the theory that the husband was liable because he permitted his wife to commit the tort." This view,
3. MACQuEEN, HuSBAND AND WIFE (4th ed. i9o5) c. iii, § i; cf. Capel v. Powell, 17 C.
B. N. S. 743 (864).
4. In re Beauchamp, [i9o4] i K. B. 572, 581. This was settled law, although contradictory to Wainford v. Heyl, L. R. 20 Eq. 321 (1875), where the court's theory was that a wife
is incapable of committing a tort-the fiction being that it was her husband who commited it.
5. Couzens-Hardy, M. R., in Cuenod v. Leslie, [I9og] i K. B. 88o, 885. See also Drury
v. Dennis, Yelv. Io6 (K. B. 16o8).
6. That the joining of both spouses was more than a formality was clearly recognized
by Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in Cuenod v. Leslie, [I9W9] i K. B. 88o, 887.
7. To the common law lawyer it was inconceivable that a wife should be capable of
suing or being sued in her name alone. Drury v. Dennis, Yelv. io6 (K. B. i6O8). But that
this should be the primary reason for transferring the liability itself to the husband, as was
intimated by Viscount Cave in Edwards v. Porter, [1925] A. C. I, 7, does not seem tenable.
8. Yelv. io6 (K. B. 16o8) ; cf. Beaumont v. Kaye, [1904] i K. B. 292.
9.Wainford v. Heyl, L. R. 2o Eq. 321 (1875). Underlying this statement is apparent
the fiction that husband and wife are but one person in the eye of the law. "Vir et uxor sunt
quasi unica persona, quia caro una, et sanguis unus." Co. LiTr. *112a; cf. Wennhak v.
Morgan, 20 Q. B. D. 635 (1888).
io. See cases cited supra note 2, and criticism of this reasoning by Viscount Cave in
Edward v. Porter, [1925] A. C. I.
ii. Scott v. Morley, 2o Q. B. D. 120, 124 (1888).
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likewise, is without legal support. The husband's responsibility extended to torts
though committed out of his presence and while living apart from his wife 12
when he could not possibly have prevented the commission of the wrong. The
very fact that he could not, for example, enjoin her from wrongfully pledging
his credit,' 3 should have been sufficient judicial pronouncement belying the
concept that he maintained that degree of enforceable control over her necessary to make him liable for her misconduct. Indeed, in assuming that a husband
can always exert his superior influence to deter the acts of a recalcitrant wife
even when she is in his presence, the law spoke with the naive inexperience of
bachelorhood.'However, running through many of the cases seems to be one very influential, if infrequently voiced, consideration. In one way or another, courts have
indicated that if a substantive liability were not placed upon the husband,
the aggrieved party would be without relief since all of the wife's property
vested in her husband upon marriage.15 This, at least, seems to be a more
realistic explanation, although an historical inquiry into the status of husband
and wife reveals that it was not the basis for the common law rule.
Examining the marital relationship as it existed under the feudal system,
it appears that husband and wife occupied respectively the positions of lord and
vassal-more familiarly described in the language of that time as baron and
feme. But there was no such assimilation by the baron of the personality of the
feme as would justify the conclusion, so erroneously stated by jurists and commentators, that the two were but one individual. The identity of the wife was
merely inferior to that of her husband, but each maintained individual legal personalities. '" By the marriage contract she "commended" herself to her lord,
thereby promising to pay him service and obedience. In return, he undertook,
as part of his feudal responsibilities, to provide her with subsistence and protection so long as the relation continued. In fulfillment of this, the husband was
responsible for his wife's debts to the extent of his obligation to maintain her.
His duty to protect her in a society that demanded "an eye for an eye and a tooth
for a tooth" rendered him responsible for her torts." It is this same reciprocal
relationship between a lord and his vassal that gave rise to the doctrine of re8
spondeat superior."
Unmindful of the feudal origin of a husband's liability, but stimulated by
the feeling that the burden imposed was, perhaps, too great, the English courts
proceeded to engraft an arbitrary exception upon the common law rule. In
Liverpool Adelphi Loan Association v. Fairhurst19 a wife entered into a surety
contract with plaintiff, falsely representing that she was unmarried. On the
Head v. Briscoe, 5 Car. & P. 4 84 (N. P. 1833).
13. Webster v. Webster, [1916] i K. B. 714.
14. When Mr. Bumble was told that he was responsible for his wife's conduct, and that,
in fact, he was the more guilty of the two in the eye of the law, for the law supposes that a
wife acts under her spouse's direction, Mr. Bumble replied: "If that's the eye of the law,
the law's a bachelor; and the worst that I wish the law is, that his eye may be opened by
12.

experience."

CHARLEs

DICKENS,

OLIvER TwIsT.

15. Head v. Briscoe, 5 Car. & P. 484 (N. P. 1833) ; Wainford v. Heyl, L. R. 2o Eq. 321
(875) ; cf. Palmer v. Wakefield, 3 Beav. 227 (Rolls Ct. 184o) ; Capel v. Powell, 17 C. B. N.
S. 743 (1864).
16. See Gottliffe v. Edelston, [,930] 2 K. B. 378, 386, for a discussion of the fiction of
unity of spouses.
17. Consequently a husband was not liable for his wife's torts after dissolution of the
marriage, nor for debts beyond necessities.
18. See Kingan & Co., Ltd. v. Silvers, 13 Ind. App. 8o, 94, 37 N. E. 413, 417 (1895). For
an exceptionally good discussion of the feudal basis for husband's liability, see Pledge, Htsband's Liability for Wife's Torts (925) 69 SOL. J. 390.
19. 9 Ex. 422 (1854).
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strength of this representation, plaintiff advanced money to X. When X defaulted, plaintiff discovered the misrepresentation and brought a tort action
against both husband and wife, alleging the wife's fraud. The court refused
to permit recovery on the theory that while a husband is generally liable for the
tort of his wife, this applies only to "naked torts", and he is not responsible
where the tort is directly connected with her contract and is the means of effecting it. This verbal distinction, however, is without substance, the whole being
designed purely for the relief of husbands.20
Once the courts had committed themselves to the major premise that a
husband was liable for his wife's torts, then an application of the minor premise
that fraud or misrepresentation was a well recognized tort could lead inevitably
to the conclusion that a husband was liable for his wife's frauds or misrepresentations irrespective of whether or not the misrepresentation induced a contract.
The tendency towards the alleviation of the husband's responsibility gathered its greatest impetus after the passage of the Married Women's Property
Act,2' which provided, inter alia, that:
"A married woman shall be capable of . . . suing and being sued,

either in contract or in tort, or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a
feme sole, and her husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant . . .and any damages or costs recovered against her in any action

or proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property, and not otherwise."
Although this language would appear clearly to indicate the complete emancipation of married women and the purpose of abrogating the common law liability
of husbands, Seroka v.Kattenburg,2 the first case clearly to decide the point,
held otherwise. The court reasoned that since the Act did not in so many words
state that a husband was no longer liable, it would be impossible to repeal the
common law by mere implication. The only perceptible effect of the Act was
c * . . to give [the plaintiff] the option of suing the wife where she has
separate property, and there is a chance of the plaintiff being able to enforce
a judgment against her; while in cases where there would be no chance
of enforcing the judgment against the wife, the husband is left subject to
his old common law liabilities."

23

24
Although this holding was substantially followed in the later cases, it

aroused considerable disagreement among the judges.2 5 Against this view it was
urged that, since the foundation of the husband's liability was the fact that his
wife's property vested in him upon marriage, and that she could not be sued
alone, there was no reason2 for continuing the rule in the face of an Act which

removed these disabilities.. 1

20. Earle v. Kingscote, [19oo] 2 Ch. 585; Edwards v. Porter, [1925] A. C. I, cited note
7, supra, at 16, 21, 36.
21. 45 & 46 Vic. c. 75, § i (2).
22. 17 Q. B. D. i77 (I886).
23. Id. at i79. The exercise of the option is completely at the discretion of the plaintiff;
there is no necessity of proof that the wife is judgment proof in order that the suit be maintainable against the spouses jointly.
Since the Act provided only that "husband need not be joined", this was not interpreted
as a mandate absolving him from responsibility.
24. Earle v. Kingscote, [i90o] 2 Ch. 585, cited note 20, supra.
25. Alverstone, M. R., in Earle v. Kingscote, [i9oo] 2 Ch. 585, 588, cited note 20, supra,
approving, deviated little from the argument advanced by the court in Seroka v. Kattenburg.
26. Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in Cuenod v. Leslie, [igog] i K. B. 88o, cited note 5,supra,
at 886; Earl of Birkenhead and Viscount Cave in Edwards v. Porter, [1925] A. C. i, cited
note 7, supra, at 6, 7; cf. McNeall v. Hawes, [1923] 1 K. B.273.
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Not until 1925 did the Act come before the House of Lords for interpretation in Edwards v. PorterY It was there held (two of the five judges dissenting) that the Act does not abrogate the common law liability except insofar as
Section 14 provides that the husband is liable for his wife's antenuptial torts only
to the extent that he acquires her property by reason of the marriage."
Much of the controversy, however, might well have been averted had the
courts been more fully aware of the fact that the husband's liability was not
dependent either on his wife's right to hold property or her immunity from suit
without his joinder. While the Act removed her disabilities, in these respects, it in
no way affected the reciprocal duties of service and protection which initiated
the husband's responsibility. And so long as these remain, or, if under modern
conditions there is present an equally valid basis for continuing the husband's
liability, there is no reason for abolishing the doctrine still prevailing in England.
In the United States, the common law rule was followed without question
for a considerable period. Like the English courts, no serious attention was
paid by the American judiciary to the reason for the rule beyond a cursory repetition of legalistic shibboleth. Thus we find the courts echoing the theory of
unity of person, 29 control of the husband over the acts of his wife 30 as well as

her property,8 ' necessity for joinder as a matter of form 3 2 -in a vain effort to
explain the origin of the principle. Several of the courts quite frankly based
their decisions on the ground that to hold otherwise would leave injured third
parties without substantial redress, 33 while other courts, equally frank, indicated their ignorance of the foundation for the rule."'
Insofar as the scope of the husband's liability was concerned, the rule in
most states did not differ materially from that applied in England. Several of
the American cases, 35 however, went so far as to exact punitive damages from a
husband for the malicious tort of his wife. In at least one jurisdiction, it was
declared that if the wrong was committed in the presence of the husband, and
nothing more appears, the husband alone is legally answerable. 9 But with
the exception of such infrequent variations the English doctrine was followed
explicitly even to the extent
of relieving the husband where the tort was one
37
"growing out of contract."
[1925] A. C. i, cited note 7, supra.
28. Earle v. Kingscote, [19oo] 2 Ch. 585, cited note 20, supra.
29. Young v. Newsome, i8o N. C. 315, 104 S. E. 66o (192o) ; Lombard v. Batchelder, 58
Vt. 558, 5 Atl. 51 (1886) ; see Nichols v. Nichols, 147 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947 (1898).
30. Bourland v. Baker, 141 Ark. 280, 284, 216 S. W. 707, 709 (1939) ; dissenting opinion
by Maxwell, J., in Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 377, 94 Pac. 360, 363 (3908).
31. Henley v. Wilson, 137 Cal. 273, 70 Pac. 21 (19o2) ; McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa
224 (0873).
32. Graham v. Tucker, 56 Fla. 307, 47 So. 563 (908); Miscio v. Williams, 129 Tenn. 504,
27.

167 S. W. 473 (1914).
33. Meeks v. Johnston, 85 Fla. 248, 95 So. 67o (923)

; Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129,

44 Pac. 833 (1896).
34. Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 36o (19o8), cited note 33, supra; cf. Earle
v. Kingscote, [19oo] 2 Ch. 585, cited note 2o, supra.
35. Lombard v. Batchelder, 58 Vt. 558, 5 Atl. 511 (1886) ; cited note 29, supra; see Sargeant v. Fedor, 3 N. J. Misc. 832, 330 Atl. 207 (1925) ; McQueen v. Fulgham, 27 Tex. 463

(1864). No English case has been found where this point was decided.
36. The theory here is that the wife acts under her huband's coercion, but actual coercion
need not be proved. Edwards v. Wessinger, 65 S. C. I6I, 43 S. E. 518 (1902) ; see also
McKeown v. Johnson, i M'Cord 578 (S. C. 1822).
37. Andrews v. Ormsbee, II Mo. 400 (1848) ; Keen v. Hartman, 48 Pa. 497 (1865) ; cf.
Scott v. Brazile, 292 S. W. 185 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).

NOTES

But with the introduction of various married women's acts, liberalizing the
legal status of women, 38 the first decisive step toward a wholesale abrogation
of the common law rule was taken by American courts. In a large minority of
the jurisdictions it was decided that legislation of this character completely abolhowever, the common
ished the husband's40 liability.30 In the majority of states,
41
law still prevailed, with only occasional modifications.
Such ingress having been made, it was not long before the persuasion of
the feminist movement resulted in an almost complete abandonment of the 2rule
imposing liability on husbands. This was accomplished for the most part 4 by
express legislation.43 In general these statutes provided that a husband is only
liable with his wife where he participates with, commands, or coerces her into
commission of the tort. Or, as sometimes phrased, he is only liable where
he would be jointly liable with her if no marriage existed between them.
At the present time there are only a very few states which have not abolished
the common law rule, and even in those states its effect has been limited either
by statute or judicial interpretation of the married women's acts. In Texas, for
38. In general terms these provide that a married woman may take and hold property,
sue and be sued, and in other respects act as if she were unmarried.
39. Bourland v. Baker, I41 Ark. 280, 216 S. W. 707 (igig) ; although previous cases in
this state had held that the married women's act had not affected the common law: Minor v.
Mapes, xo2 Ark. 351, 144 S. W. 219 (1912); Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 360
(igo8) ; Wolf v. Keagy, 33 Del. 362, 136 Atl. 520 (927) ; Norris v. Corkill, 32 Kan. 409, 4
Pac. 862 (1884) ; Lane v. Bryant, IOO Ky. 138, 37 S. W. 584 (1896) ; Harris v. Webster, 58
N. H. 481 (1878) ; Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 329, 44 Pac. 833 (1896). The reason advanced in these cases as the basis for the common law rule was either that the wife had no
control over her property, or that she was under a disability to be sued sole. Since the acts
abolished these "reasons" for the rule, it was only natural that their effect should have been
to abrogate the husband's liability.
40. Henley v. Wilson, McElfresh v. Kirkendall, both supra note 3I; Choen v. Porter, 66
Ind. 194 (3879) ; Ferguson v. Brooks, 67 Me. 251 (3879) ; Pett-Morgan v. Kennedy, 62 Minn.
348, 64 N. W. 912 (1895) ; Nichols v. Nichols, 147 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947 (1898) ; Fitzgerald
v. Quann, lO9 N. Y. 441, 17 N. E. 354 (1888); Presnell v. Moore, 12o N. C. 390, 27 N. E. 27
(3897) ; Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (3884); Henderson v. Wendler, 39 S. C. 555, 17 S. E.
85i (3893) ; Zeliff v. Jennings, 6I Tex. 458 (3884).
43. In a few cases, the married women's act was held to have the effect of relieving the
husband to the extefit that he was not liable for his wife's torts arising out of the management of her separate estate or the conduct of her own business. Harrington v. Jagmetty, S3
N. J. L. 548, 83 AtI. 88o (1932).
42. Without reference to any legislation, the Nebraska court held that the common law
rule did not exist in that state. Goken v. Dallugge, 72 Neb. I6, 3O3 N. W. 287 (9o5).
43. A"A CODE (Michie, 1928) § 8266; Hopper v. Crocker, 7 Ala. App. 372, 85 So. 843
(392o); CONN. GEN. STAT. (3930) § 5172; Blakeslee v. Tyler, 55 Conn. 397, 11 Atl. 855
(3887) ; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 4413; Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 320, 152 S. E.
278 (i93O); ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 68, 4; Christensen v. Johnston, 207 Ill. App.
209 (3917) ; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 8742; Mayhew v. Burns, 3O3 Ind. 328, 2 N. E.

793 (I885); ME. Rzv. STAT. (393o) c. 74, §4; Marcus v. Rovinsky, 95 Me. io6, 49 At. 420
(39O); MycH. CoiP. LAws (i929) § 34015; Sweezey-v. Fisher, 142 Mich. 258, 305 N. W.
749 (Io5); Mo. REv. STAT. (I929) § 329o; Drake v. Rowan, 216 Mo. App. 663, 272 S. W.

ioi (1925) ; N. Y. Dom. RELATiONS LAw (3909) c. 14, § 57 (husband still liable to the extent he acquires wife's property by antenuptial agreement) ; Tanzer v. Read, I6o App. Div.
584, 145 N. Y. Supp. 708 (1914); O nIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, I93O) § 8002;
Bretzfelder v. Demaree, 3O2 Ohio St. 105, 13o N. E. 505 (392) ; R. I. GEN. LAws (1923)
c. 290, § 12; McElroy v. Capron, 24 R. I. 56I, 54 AtI. 44 (39o2) ; S. D. ComP. LAvs (1929)
(917) § 3526;
§ 175; Bebout v. Pense, 35 S. D. 14, 35o N. W. 289 (934) ; VT. GEN. LAws
Fadden v. McKinney, 87 Vt. 316, 89 Atl. 351 (3934) ; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington,
1932) § 6904; Killingsworth v. Keen, 89 Wash. 597, 154 Pac. 3O96 (3936).
1930) 946;
No cases have arisen under the following statutes: N. J. CoMp. STAT. (Supp.
N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1931) § 258; S. C. CODE CIV. PROc. (Michie, 1932) §400; W.
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 4750.
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example, no statute has ever been passed which expressly abrogates the responsibility of a husband; but under a married women's act

44

it has been held 4 that

his responsibility is limited to the amount of his interest in the community property. His separate estate is immune from execution. 4 In Nevada, on the other
hand, the only limitation is that the spouses be living together. 47 In Florida,
there has been no legislative enactment affecting a husband's liability, and the
common law remains in force unchanged either by any married women's act or
by judicial mandate. 48 Although it would seem, therefore, that only these few
jurisdictions retain a semblance of the common law principle, there is still present in many of the states which have renounced the doctrine a perceptible
tendency to impose liability on a husband in the guise of some other principle.
One of the most popular methods of holding him liable is the family purpose
doctrine, parading a little too obviously as a principle of agency. But even in a
state where the family purpose doctrine is not in effect, some courts have gone
to the length of finding a husband liable on the theory that his wife was acting
as agent, when the facts clearly indicate that there is no basis for such a conclusion.49
The reason for the adoption of these devices is to provide a more responsible
source of relief for injured third persons, than a wife is likely to be.
Admitting that a modern wife no longer occupies the servile position of
her Victorian sister, so that there is no "feudal" duty of service which she owes
her husband, it is highly doubtful whether she has reached that stage of economic
independence warranting a complete disregard of her husband as an important
source of her financial responsibility. In few cases does the wife retain a
separate estate out of the property acquired by the common industry of the
spouses. And if financial responsibility is to be the basis for imposing a vicarious
liability-as apparently it is-then there would seem to be good reason for holding a husband responsible, even today, for his wife's torts.
But, although the application of the common law rule would effect no hardship where the tort is committed by the impecunious wife of a wealthy husband,
it might well shock the social conscience in those cases where the wife is of ample
means but her husband is not. As a matter of practical effect, however, the hardship on the husband would be small for, the suit being jointly against both husband
and wife, the plaintiff holding a judgment would in most cases satisfy it out of the
property of the more responsible spouse. But to make assurance doubly sure, and
perhaps to cover that case vhere both spouses have equal financial resources,
the best solution would seem to be that adopted by several courts in the early
cases. 10 Where a judgment is recovered execution should be permitted out of
the husband's property only when the community property is insufficient, and the
community property should be exempted until an unsuccessful attempt has been
made to reach the wife's separate property.
44. T~x. REv. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 4613.
45. Jackson v. Dickey, 281 S. W. 1O43 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926) ; Campbell v. Johnson,
284 S. W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
46. Suit, however, may be brought against husband and wife jointly, against the wife
alone, or against husband alone. Campbell v. Johnson, 284 S. W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926),
cited note 46, supra.
47. Nay. Co.%ip. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) §8546.
48. Meeks v. Johnston, 85 Fla. 248, 95 So. 670 (923).
49. Johnson v. Newman, 168 Ark. 836, 271 S. W. 705 (1925); Crawford v. McElhinney,
171 Iowa 6o6, 154 N. W. 3IO (1915); cf. Cohen v. Hill, 286 S. W. 661 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926). Contra: Bretzfelder v. Demaree, lO2 Ohio St. l05, 13o N. E. 5o5 (1921), cited note
43, supra.
50. Quick v. Miller, 103 Pa. 67 (1883) ; Choen v. Porter, 66 Ind. 194 (1879), cited note

4o, supra; Nichols v. Nichols, 147 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947 (1898), cited note 29, supra.
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However with the state of the law in the United States as it is today, there
is but little hope that either the courts or the legislatures will reverse themselves
to adopt such a technique. At most, courts will probably continue to distort
factual situations to hold husbands responsible on some accepted theory where
too great an injustice to injured parties would seem imminent. In England,
however, there is a greater possibility that the prevailing doctrine will be retained,
if only in modified form, by the Lord Chancellor's committee, but even that is
open to serious doubt if the origin of the common law rule and its present adaptable utility continue to be obscured.
S.E.

